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ABSTRACT
Economic transformation is still an ongoing process in many
European countries. Despite common economic roots, the current
economic situations are developing differently in different coun-
tries. This article will consider the process of economic transform-
ation in terms of the banking sector. It aims to assess the level of
banking stability throughout the transformation process in the
Western Balkan region, and to assess the determinates of banking
stability. A tool based on the Macroeconomic Stability Pentagon
is used to estimate banking stability. The study finds that in most
of the researched countries, the most common determinates of
banking stability are market concentration and market competi-
tion. Additionally, it finds that the stability of banking systems in
two countries – relatively the most transformed in the region
(Croatia) and the one which is considered the most delayed
(Serbia) – are influenced by similar factors, while the other bank-
ing systems in the region, despite common roots and experien-
ces, vary in terms of the factors affecting their banking stability.
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Economic transformation is still an ongoing process in Europe which still is present
in the research. (Åslund, 2018; Voicu et al., 2018)
Many European countries are at different stages in their transition to a market
economy. Some of these countries originate from the same state – the former
Socialist Federal Republic (SFR) of Yugoslavia, which means they have a common
economic history and common current experience in building their statehood from
scratch. These countries have long fought for their independence and sovereignty.
For many years, SFR Yugoslavia was a federal republic, consisting of six provinces.
Economic results in SFR Yugoslavia that were achieved due to changing from a cen-
trally planned economy to the so-called ‘third way’ were not visible in other aspects
of socio-economic life (Yarashevich and Karneyeva, 2013). Despite the relatively high
average annual GDP growth rate, the Yugoslav economy struggled with the problem
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of unemployment (Boduszynski, 2010), and non-market forces affecting the banking
system that led to its deep inefficiency (Kukic, 2017). Moreover, the country had
always been a home to a very diverse population, both in terms of national and reli-
gious affiliations (Illes, 2011). Religious differences among Orthodox Christian Serbs,
Catholic Croats, and Muslim Bosnians, and the rise of nationalism contributed to the
collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991. In the 1980s, inter-ethnic tensions grew and developed
into open war conflicts, as a result of which the former republics later declared their
independence. After the sanguinary conflicts, the countries had to be rebuilt and
needed to heal their economies, including all institutions responsible for financial
markets. Thus, they started their journey towards political and economic
transformation.
The banking sector plays a special role in the economy and is particularly vul-
nerable to unfavourable economic changes. Due to this, this article will consider
the process of economic transformation in terms of the banking sector’s stability.
The stability of banking systems cannot be overestimated in conditions of stable
economic growth, and even more it is an important issue with regard to econo-
mies in transit.
The aims of this article are to assess the level of banking stability throughout the
transformation process in the Western Balkan region, and to assess the influence of
the transformation process and macroeconomic conditions on banking stability.
The article is divided into two main parts. The first addresses theoretical issues
related to the main theme, i.e., the transformation of the banking system and its sta-
bility. The second part assesses the level of stability of banking systems in the trans-
formation period and the determinants of banking stability. A new tool based on the
Macroeconomic Stability Pentagon (MSP) is used to estimate banking stability. The
impact of determinants on banking stability is analysed using multiple regression for
five countries, covering the period of 2001–2015. The research is limited to a 14-year
period since the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) no
longer provides a full update of the Transition Report, which was the database of the
determinates of banking transformation used in the study in the form of the Triangle
of Banking Reforms according to Fries and Taci (2002). The economic data come
from single central banks’ databases.
Despite the decade-long delay in starting economic transformation compared to
Central and Eastern Europe, the issue of a direct comparison of Western Balkan
countries and post-transition European states is popular (Bongini et al., 2017;
Iwanicz-Drozdowska et al., 2017). Therefore, the economic situation of the Western
Balkans should be considered separately and not together with the region of Central-
Eastern Europe. A further reason for this is the different economic environment
which affects the Western Balkans now. Recent years have shown that the countries
of this region have faced several challenges at the same time, such as the transform-
ation process and the 2008 economic crisis.
The research conducted so far is on the one hand largely fragmentary and, on the
other hand, the Western Balkans region is not a separate research topic, but rather is
discussed at the same time, together with other transition economies from Central
and Eastern Europe which are undoubtedly more engaged in the transformation
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process. Therefore, it can be concluded that the presented article is a contribution to
the development of knowledge and research on the relationship between the banking
sector and processes occurring in the economy with regard to the countries of the
Western Balkans region.
2. Banking stability and its determinants in the literature
The course of systemic transformation is an extremely important period for economic
growth and development, because it is during this time that the bases and founda-
tions for the further functioning of the national economic system are created. The
reconstruction of the banking system is a key element of economic transformation,
because efficient commercial banks are a prerequisite for launching competition with-
out which privatisation will fail. As transformation is also a process that causes a cer-
tain chaos in the economic system, activities that bring stability to the economy and
its individual sectors, including the banking system, become important.
An analysis of literature regarding the stability of the banking system, or, more
broadly, the stability of the financial system, show that there is no single universal
definition of the concept (OzieRbło, 2014; Rogowski and Mesjasz, 2012; Jayakumar,
Pradhan, Chatterjee, Sarangi, & Dash, 2017; Bruha and Kocenda, 2017). However, the
literature defines the basic features and attributes that the banking system must meet
to be stable. These include the fulfilment of basic functions for other economic sec-
tors and the continuous interaction between these sectors, and the lack of crisis-
related issues. The stability of the banking system manifests itself in the way the sys-
tem operates, and a prerequisite is fulfilling tasks in a continuous and effective man-
ner, even in conditions of unexpected and unfavourable disturbances of a significant
scale. One should be aware that the banking system performs above all a service role
in relation to other economic sectors, which consequently means that disruptions in
its functioning, manifesting themselves, for example, in disruptions in the effective-
ness of providing financial intermediation services, will adversely affect the condition
of other system participants, including enterprises and households. Hence, maintain-
ing the stability of the banking system as well as the entire financial system is
very important.
Considering the above, definitions from various authors for the concept of banking
system stability, as an element of the financial system, can be classified into three
groups: stability determined by the quality of the banking system, stability as the rela-
tionship between the banking system and other economic sectors, and stability under-
stood as a lack of crisis.
The quality of the banking system refers to the quality of its operation. There are
several conditions and features that a banking system should display in order for its
operation to be considered good quality. These include the right structure, a stable
legal framework, credibility and transparency in terms of accounting and information
principles, and socialist self-management, that reduced the state’s impact on the enti-
ties. In addition, effective supervision and discipline of markets, and an adequate
safety net also help to determine the quality of the banking system.
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The relationship between the banking system and other economic sectors is used
by many researchers to define banking stability because the banking system has a
huge significance on the overall economy. This is due to the immensely important
function of banks as financial intermediaries. The dependence of other sectors on the
banking sector highlights its importance for the whole economy. A stable and a
healthy banking sector, combined with the balance of public finances, may contribute
to the stability of the whole economic system. An interesting stance on banking sec-
tor stability can be gained by studying it in the context of its effect on public finance
crises (Gemzik-Salwach, 2013). The insolvency of countries influences the banking
sector through various transmission channels, including the current account balance,
security and safety, and public aid (Smaga, 2013).
The third definition of banking sector stability describes it as the absence of finan-
cial crises. This kind of definition is found most frequently in the literature.
However, even such a simple formulation raises many questions due to differences in
the understanding of the term ‘financial crisis’. On the one hand, the classical litera-
ture on financial crises virtually does not define them, and on the other, a review of
the literature on empirical studies in this scope indicates the existence of many differ-
ent definitions, and a combination of these definitions must therefore be of a fairly
general character.
Although there are many theories that try to explain the concept of banking sector
stability, it should be noted that as a whole, all the definitions show the main features
that are indispensable for achieving and maintaining banking sector stability
in practice.
3. Determinants of banking stability
The literature suggests several factors that influence banking stability, classifying them
into macroeconomic, financial, structural and institutional variables. Studies concern-
ing the economy also state that the appropriate coordination and discipline of monet-
ary and fiscal policy help with the stability of the banking system (Aikman, Giese,
Kapadia, & McLeay, 2018). A consistent structural policy and striving for a balance
of payments also help to ensure banking stability (Mester, 2017).
High capital requirements are believed to be a barrier for new competitors in the
banking sector. This decreases competition and prevents already functioning institu-
tions from performing highly risky actions (Agoraki, Delis, & Pasiouras, 2011). This
view is consistent with results of previous studies of stability obtained due to declin-
ing credit risk (Bolt and Tieman, 2004, Barth, Lin, Lin, & Song, 2009). On the other
hand, the impact of increased capital requirements has been found to decrease fran-
chise value and increase the number of risky transactions (Hellmann et al., 2000).
The impact of competition on stability has been analysed for many years. On the
one hand, banks with a stronger market power are characterised with lower general
risk associated with ‘competition instability’(Berger & Bouwman, 2009). However,
Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens (2013) found that an increase of competition resulted
in bank instability in a more restrictive environment.
An increase in market concentration increases financial fragility. Markets with a
limited number of banks gain high market power, which is an incentive to increase
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interest rates on credit. This can lead to disturbances because of increased credit risk
(Fu, Lin, & Molyneux, 2014).
The influence of banking regulations on banking stability has been studied by vari-
ous researchers (Barth et al., 2009, Klomp and De Haan, 2014). Despite that, there is
no single conclusion on this topic. The issue is even less recognised in transition
economies, with a limited number of exceptions (Agoraki et al., 2011).
For a banking system in a period of transformation, ongoing reforms, including
the launching of a new legal order, are of significant importance, especially for its
financial results. Effective legal systems and corporate governance facilitate the devel-
opment of the financial market through better contracting and law enforcement
mechanisms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). Stronger legal
governance encourages managers to take more risky but probably more profitable
investments (Fang, Iftekhar, & Marton, 2014). On the other hand, stronger govern-
ance for creditors’ rights tends to discourage this behaviour and leads to less diversifi-
cation of funding sources (Acharya et al., 2017). Focusing on banking institutions,
Laeven and Levine (2009) showed that banks with strong shareholders take more
risk, and domestic regulations affect this banking risk, which may affect the bank’s
ownership structure. J.Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010) extended the analysis of
creditor rights and information exchange. Their findings showed that enhanced cred-
itor collateral is associated with greater banking risk, and better information sharing
reduces this risk.
Bokros (2001) lists several drivers of banking. These include financial intermedi-
ation in relation to GDP, poor asset quality and low capitalisation of institutions, a
limited range of services (especially in the non-banking sector), immature external
and internal governance structures, and a gradually evolving legal and regulatory
framework with poor implementation and enforcement. Keren and Ofer (2002)
describes two groups of bad loans that the banking sector faces during the transform-
ation period. The first group is in some way inherited from the centrally planned
economy. The second group consists of completely new loans granted by newly estab-
lished banks, which are created thanks to liberal supervision and relatively loose cap-
ital regulations. The growing share of these loans proves a lack of knowledge of risk
assessment, lack of project monitoring and lack of or insufficiently developed corpor-
ate governance. For this reason, many of the transitioning countries experience an
increase in lending, which results in a credit crisis, a threat to macroeconomic equi-
librium, and even a decline in real GDP and a high degree of risk aversion. The col-
lapse of the economy deprives the banking systems of most resources, because when
the real sector of the economy records a recession, major losses in the banking system
cannot be avoided. In most cases, these shocks eventually lead to the tightening of
monetary policy and prudential rules. Such crises favour the restructuring of systemic
market participants, but on the other hand, they create a great burden during the sta-
bilisation process and contribute to an increase in risk aversion. Consolidation and
recapitalisation has always been costly for the budget, so it was approached in con-
junction with the reform of the tax system. The savings are small at the time, the cap-
ital resources insufficient and distracted, and their relationship to the total assets
minimal. The gradual privatisation and orderly process of opening up to foreign
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banks facilitate improvement of the banking system and improve market management
both in banks and in enterprises to which banks grant loans.
It has been said that a strong supervision authority may improve banks’ manage-
ment, their efficiency and simultaneously the stability of the market (Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, & Levine, 2006). Chortareas, Magkonis, Moschos, and Panagiotidis (2015)
believe that more efficient supervision and stronger legal frameworks have had a posi-
tive impact on the profitability of banks through various channels such as decreasing
the risk of market turbulence, lowering the risk of financial problems and limiting
the agency problems and market power. On the other hand, such institutions may
make banks support selected interests of public institutions (Beck et al., 2006).
The literature on banking stability shows that the issue is of key importance, but it
is not yet clear what its main determinants are. Therefore, each attempt to describe
or assess determinants of banking stability is worth trying.
4. Research methods
The empirical part of this paper gives a comparative analysis of the macroeconomic
situation and the banking sectors of several countries in the Western Balkans: Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Serbia for the period
2001–2015. Macroeconomic and banking sector stability was measured with two
tools. The first one is the MSP, which is an extension and complement to the
‘magical quadrangle’ launched by A.W.Philips and R.W.Mundell, created to analyse
the conditions of a given economy (Rapacki, 2003). The MSP was developed in
Poland by the Institute of Convictions and Foreign Trade Prices, and popularised by
Kołodko (1993). The advantages of the tool are that it assesses economic stability
using several key indicators simultaneously (Malina and Mierzwa, 2014).
The MSP has been used in various studies researching the stability of economies
in Central and Eastern Europe. For example, it was used to assess the impact of the
recent economic crisis on economic growth in the region. The period between 2008
and 2010 was recognised as an unstable period, after which the economies in the
region started heading towards economic stability ( _Zuchowska, 2013). The concept of
the MSP was examined in terms of its suitability for low and middle-income EU
countries, including Ukraine. The model proved to be useful not only in the area of
public administration, but also for micro-level management, and the authors of the
study proposed the implementation of a micro-economic stabilisation pentagon in
research on enterprises (Lyulyov and Shvindina, 2017). The tool was also used to esti-
mate the macroeconomic stability of individual South-Central-Eastern European
economies such as Romania (Abrudan, 2013), Poland (Janecki, 2017) and Russia
(Walewski, 2015).
Other studies on macroeconomic stability concerned the economies of the
Southern EU. It was confirmed that the MSP is an appropriate tool for comparative
analysis and its use creates preconditions for appropriate policies of economic stabil-
isation (Hurduze and Lazar, 2015). Similar conclusions were drawn in the study of
Germany’s economy, and stated that the model is an effective method of mapping
the real condition of a given economy (Raczkowski, 2016).
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A similar tool is called the Banking Stability Pentagon (BSP) as presented in
Figure 1. Its concept is based on the MSP, and was created as a result of research
into the banking sectors of different countries (Kubiszewska, 2017; Komorowski
and Kubiszewska, 2016).
The ratios used in the BSP are regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (capital
adequacy), nonperforming loans to total gross loans (assets quality), return on assets
(earnings), liquid assets to total assets (liquidity), and net open position on foreign
exchange to capital (sensitivity to market risk). These ratios are capital-based, asset-
based, and income-based, and are the same as most of the ratios used in the
CAMELS model.
Capital adequacy is measured using the ratio of the share of regulatory capital in
risk-weighted assets and is based on the definition prepared by the Basel Committee
in the Basel Capital Accord. Higher capital requirements reduce the incentive for
banks to increase the risk of operations, and this helps to increase their stability
(Anginer, Demirg€uç-Kunt, & Mare, 2018). Stricter capital adequacy requirements lead
to stricter criteria for granting new loans, thereby reducing the banks’ exposure to
insolvency risk (Dreassi, Miani, Paltrinieri, & Sclip, 2018). This means that higher
capital reduces banks’ exposure to systemic risk and reduces the risk of crises and
risk of insolvency (Martinez-Miera and Suarez, 2014) because well capitalised banks
are less induced to resort to risky portfolios (Allen et al., 2016; Mehran &
Thakor, 2011).
The aim of assets quality analysis, measured using the ratio of non-performing
loans to total gross loans, is to identify potential problems with the return of credit
and the credit portfolio of the banking system as a whole and its impact on the econ-
omy (Balgova, Nies, & Piekhanov, 2016). Where banks avoid failure, non-performing
Figure 1. Banking Stability Pentagon (BSP).
Reference: own compilation, based on Kołodko (1993).
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loans negatively influence the cost structure and efficiency of the bank (Maggi and
Guida, 2013) and the bank’s willingness to lend (Cucinelli, 2015). An increasing ratio
may show a decline in the quality of the credit portfolio due to problems either in
the economy as a whole or with an individual creditor. During a credit boom, this
ratio tends to decrease and it gradually increases when general economic conditions
deteriorate (Backe, Egert, & Walko, 2017).
The return on assets ratio measures the sector’s efficiency in using its assets to pre-
sent a market’s profitability. Bank profitability is a prime determinant of bank stabil-
ity (Fidanoski et al., 2018). Over time, this ratio can provide information on the
sustainability of the sector’s asset position. On the one hand, profitable banks are
more risk-tolerant, which leads to a higher level of stability. More profitable banks
can increase their core capital and ensure their profitability. In empirical studies, it
was found that there is a negative, significant relationship between banks’ profitability
and the probability of bank failure (Cole and White, 2012; Lin and Pham et al.,
2016). On the other hand, higher profits occur only when investors are ready to
accept the possibility of losses. This means that profitable banks have more incentive
to take risks, because thanks to their profitable core business they can expand their
lending activities and take more risk in their operations, which leads to a greater like-
lihood of a crisis (Perotti, Ratnovski, & Vlahu, 2011; Martynova et al. 2016).
Moreover, the profitability measurement method is also important. While return on
equity is not important for clarifying banking problems, return on assets has a signifi-
cant positive impact (Betz, Oprica, Peltonen, & Sarlin, 2014).
The liquidity of a sector is another key indicator of its performance. In the long
run, the stable performance of both an entity and a sector is dependent on its profit-
ability and liquidity. Earning profits is a key but not an essential factor in achieving
liquidity, but profitability actively influences solvency; thus liquidity should be con-
trolled and planned both in the short term as well as in the long term. The liquidity
of assets affects their stability, influencing systemic risk. Higher liquidity ratios may
help banks to withstand sudden funding roll-offs, reduce potential losses through fire
sales, and promote stability (Rochet and Vives, 2004). The banks’ ability to sell assets
may also lead to the transfer of risk between a more sensitive and less sensitive sector
(Wagner, 2007), thereby changing the overall instability of the financial system. The
introduced Basel III framework included additional regulations on bank liquidity and
funding stability (BIS, 2010).
Sensitivity to market risk, calculated using the ratio of net open position on foreign
exchange to capital, measures the potential vulnerability of the ratio of deposit takers
to exchange rate movements. The net open position in foreign exchange identifies the
mismatch (open position) of foreign currency asset and liability positions, while its
relationship to capital signals the ability of the sector to react to a changing exchange
rate risk.
The size of the BSP is based on the estimated scales of its vertexes:
 capital to risk-weighted assets – between 8% and 30%
 non-performing loans to total gross loans – between 0% and 25%
 return on assets – between 7% and 2%
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 liquid assets to total assets – between 0% and 50%
 net open position in foreign exchange to capital – between 0% and þ/- 50%
The size of the pentagon changes automatically whenever any triangular area –
limited by two of the five vertexes – changes. The pentagon’s size equals the sum of
the five triangles and cannot exceed 1; this represents the ideal situation. The size of
the BSP is calculated using the following formula (1) which is based on the
Pythagorean theorem and Heron’s formula concerning the pyramid’s base field, the









þ ROA x Liquidity Ratioð Þ

þ Liquidity Ratio x Senstivity to Market Riskð Þ
þ Senstivity to Market Risk x CARð Þ

k (1)
Where k ¼ 1=2 sin 72
The economic analysis was conducted using annual data covering the years
2001–2015 and multiple linear regression. In order to estimate the equation calculat-
ing the banking stability value, the least-squares estimation method was employed.
The general formula for the model is as follows:
Yit ¼ ai þ b'1X1 þ b'2 X2 þ b'3 X3 þ b'4 X4 þ e (2)
where the dependent variable Y is the BSP. The independent variables are
as follows:
X1 – market structure measured using three indicators:
 LIit – Lerner index, as a measure of competition for each banking sector i in
period t,
 BONit – Bonne ratio, as a measure of competition for each banking sector i in
period t,
 CR5it – concentration ratio, CR5, for each banking sector i in period t,
 HHIit – concentration ratio, HHI, for each banking sector i in period t,
X2 - intermediation in banking sector i in period t:
a. DEPOSit – deposits in relation to GDP for banking sector i in period t,
b. CREDITit – credits in relation to GDP for banking sector i in period t,
X3 – business cycle measured either with
a. MSPit – the MSP in every country i in period t, or
b. GDP per capitait in every country i in period t,
X4 – transformation measured using the Triangle of Banking Reforms (based on Fries
& Taci, 2002).
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Multiple linear regression requires the relationships between independent and
dependent variables to be linear and it assumes that the data does not have multi-lin-
earity. Linearity and multi-linearity were tested with correlation matrices, presented
in Appendix 1. At this stage, all strongly correlated variables were discarded.
Additionally, the multiple linear regression analysis requires a normal distribution of
errors between observed and predicted values. Therefore the results of the normality
test of the model’s residual distribution are presented.
During the estimation of model parameters, attention was also paid to the fact that
the explanatory variables contained in it were not collinear (mutually correlated).
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was used for explanatory variables. The VIF for a
given independent variable Xj is defined as VIF-1/(1-Rj2) - where Rj is the multiple
correlation coefficient between variable Xj and other explanatory variables included
in the model. According to the literature on the subject, the value of VIF> 10 is a
certificate of disturbed collinearity of variables, therefore variables that did not meet
this condition were removed from the model.
5. Research results
The research is based on data for the period 2001–2015 from the annual reports on
the activities of central banks and annual reports on the stability of banking systems.
Other sources of data included the database of the International Monetary Fund –
the World Economic Outlook – and data from the EBRD, published in the annual
Transition Reports. The Eurostat database and the European Central Bank database
were used for data on EU member states.
The level of the stability of the banking sector in Western Balkan countries
between 2001 and 2015 was measured using the BSP as shown in Figure 2.
The stability of banking systems in the Western Balkans region changed in a simi-
lar way. The researched period can be divided into two sub-periods of different levels
of stability. Between 2001 and 2008, in all countries apart from Montenegro, the size
of the BSPs increased, which means that the stability of the banking sector improved.
Figure 2. BSP for Western Balkan countries between 2001 and 2015.
Source: own compilation, based on databases from central banks.
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The strongest rise was recorded in Serbia: a six-fold increase. In Macedonia and
Croatia, the size almost doubled over the period.
Montenegro was the only country in which the size of the BSP decreased between
2001 and 2008. The declining stability of this country’s banking sector was caused by
a large withdrawal of deposits and the growth of non-performing loans during the
post-crises period (Katnic and Boskovic, 2016). It was also the result of banks’ insuffi-
cient provisions for credit risk (Vucinic, 2015) and an erroneous classification of
assets, as a result of an underestimated share of non-performing loans, at a level of
2% of total loans at the end of June 2007. In addition, internal controls at banks
revealed numerous weaknesses in the risk management process, including too limited
time to assess clients’ creditworthiness (Jaeger et al., 2013). Therefore it should be
stressed that in the case of Montenegro, the large size of the BSP prior to the global
financial crisis is the consequence of the erroneous policy on assessing asset quality
and not the result of a good overall situation in the sector.
Between 2009 and 2015, in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, BSP size decreased on
average by 32%. In Macedonia and Montenegro, BSP size increased by 7% and 18%,
respectively. Banking systems in these regions are characterised by medium-strong
capital buffers that significantly exceed regulatory limits and mainly consist of first-
class capital. The liquidity of these systems can also be considered beneficial, which
suggests that they should be able to cope with unexpected shocks. However, due to a
strong concentration of banking markets, system weaknesses may arise due to prob-
lems in only a few domestic banks that will rely on support from the public sector.
In all of the discussed countries, the size of the MSP changed significantly between
2001 and 2015 (Figure 3). In 2001, the worst situation in terms of economic stability
was recorded in Macedonia; it was four times worse than Croatia’s highest point. In
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia, the MSPs grew by from
48% in Serbia to over 300% in Macedonia during the studied period. Only in
Montenegro did the indicator decrease by more than 43%.
Analysis of the individual indicators points to the transitional difficulties in each
country that appeared at the turn of 2008 and 2009 as a consequence of the global
financial crisis. Also, MSP sizes for the same period decreased as a result of negative
changes in individual indicators, which occurred much more frequently. The size of
Figure 3. MSP for Western Balkan countries between 2001 and 2015.
Source: own compilation, based on databases from central banks and the EBRD.
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the MSP decreased in at least one of the five countries in almost every year; in 2008
this happened in four countries (except Serbia), and in 2011 it occurred in all of
them due to the strong decline of GDP growth, the rise of unemployment despite the
introduced recovery plans (Kovtun, Meyer Cirkel, Murgasova, Smith, &
Tambunlertchai, 2014; Qerimi and Sergi, 2012; Jashari and Elezi, 2014), the increase
in the general government deficit (Pere and Hashorva, 2011), the current account
imbalance (Dalic, 2013) as well as in some cases – the deflation rate (Dalic, 2013;
Kuddo, 2013, Juric, 2017).
The reasons for such changes can be seen in the specific links between local econo-
mies and world markets, especially the EU. In 2008, local economies were influenced
by the global financial crisis through indirect channels (Bartlett and Monastiriotis,
2010). Although local banks did not participate in the so-called ‘trade of toxic assets’,
the high proportion of foreign investors in the assets of individual banking sectors
led to a reduction in lending activity in 2008, which in turn contributed to the deteri-
oration of the economic situation in the region. Such a variation in MSP sizes and
the lack of uniform trends in changes proves the precariousness of the economic situ-
ation in the region (Gabrisch et al., 2016; Kostadinov, 2011; Nenovski, 2012).
In 2001, the variation in the size of the Triangle of Banking Reform (TBR)
between individual countries was significant, as presented in Figure 4.
In 2001, the differences in the size of the TBR varied by up to eight times, as was
the case between Montenegro and Serbia where the TBR was the smallest, and Croatia
where the TBR was the largest. The reason for this was the situation in these countries
in the 1990s. Croatia was able to begin its economic transformation much earlier than
the other two countries where the political situation was unstable (Barisitz, 2008).
On the other hand, in 2015 the individual indicators for the TBR in Macedonia
and Croatia were similar. It should be stressed that none of the TBRs for the coun-
tries in question were equilateral, which implies that the development of the banking
sector in the different countries was uneven. Another important fact is that the pro-
portion of private assets in the banking sector for 2001 was close to 100% in two
countries - Macedonia and Croatia - and over 80% in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This
is not due to the development of the banking sector, but rather the need to create all
of the studied banking sectors from scratch.
Figure 4. TBR for Western Balkan countries between 2001 and 2015.
Source: own compilation, based on the EBRD database.
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Over the 14 years between 2001 and 2015, the levels of banking sector reform in
the individual countries became closer and differences between their TBRs stopped
being significant. Between the largest TBR (Croatia) and the smallest (Bosnia and
Herzegovina), the difference in 2015 was no more than 31%. It should be noted that
in all the countries, the share of private sector assets in the banking sector is close to
a maximum of 4.3, which means the banking sector became almost entirely private in
the early stage of economic transformation (Dimic and Barjaktarovic, 2017).
Unfortunately most of the variables used in the analysis strongly correlated
with the PSB, which was the explained variable (correlation matrix in
Appendix 1). Since the general models still had a lot of irrelevant variables, the
final model, which is fully significant, only includes variables that meet the
requirements of multiple regression (Table 1).
The estimated statistical models proved to be statistically significant (P value for F< 0.05),
which means that the examined variables significantly explain the variation in each country’s
BSP. The estimated models explain over 85% of the variations in BSPs (R2 coefficient) in all
countries except for Bosnia, where the R2 coefficient was lower – 70.69%. This raises a ques-
tion about other factors that influence banking stability in this country.
In all but one of the studied countries, the concentration of the banking market
significantly impacts banking stability, but the determinants of banking stability vary
Table 1. Models with reduced variables.
Serbia Croatia Montenegro Macedonia BH
Constant 0.724316 0.0168114 1.97336 0.0584149 0.179422
(0.130365) (0.164627) (0.393109) (0.0309413) (0.102392)
CR5 –0.00859 — 0.010372 — 0.00848372
(0.00177168) (0.00397781) (0.00151478)
LI — 1.8421 — — —
(0.595448)
BON –0.132886 2.21178 — — —
(0.0497891) (0.416828)




GDP per capita 0.000111
(1.01439e-05)
Serbia Croatia Montenegro Macedonia BH
Mean dependent var. 0.353361 0.439166 0.460943 0.318030 0.391435
Sum squared residues 0.021108 0.020734 0.049713 0.016498 0.018512
R-squared 0.889010 0.832671 0.922678 0.855918 0.706991
Log likelihood 27.96209 28.09617 21.53748 29.81038 28.94634
Schwarz criterion 45.09198 45.36013 34.95082 54.20467 52.47659
Autocorrelation of residues – rho1 0.116551 0.094079 0.214298 0.090436 0.025778
S.D. dependent var. 0.043805 0.043415 0.064364 0.035624 0.067177
standard error of residues 0.858740 0.787036 0.909790 0.844834 0.037736
F-statistic F 0.000015 0.000140 2.14e-07 7.88e-07 0.000086
Akaike info criterion 47.92418 48.19233 37.07497 55.62077 53.89269
Hannana-Quinna criterion 47.95435 48.22250 37.09759 55.63585 53.90777
Normality test:
null hypothesis: random component is normally distributed.
Chi-squared test 1.5169 4.83057 0.958634 1.41706 1.12527
p value 0.468391 0.0893417 0.619206 0.492368 0.569705
Notes: p< 0.10, p< 0.05, p< 0.01.
Reference: own preparation.
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among countries, as does the direction of the influence of market concentration. In
Serbia and Montenegro, a decrease in market concentration increases the BSP; while
in Bosnia it works in the opposite way. The changes in concentration are related to a
change in market competition, which is confirmed in Serbia and Croatia only where
more competition (a decrease in either the Bonnie or Lerner indices) causes an
increase in stability. In Croatia, this effect was much stronger, and the Lerner index
also plays a significant role.
On one hand, these different results may be explained with the hypothesis intro-
duced by Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010): the relationship between competition
in the banking sector and banking risk is non-linear (i.e., it has the U-shape of a
square function). On the other hand, the observed changes of the banking markets in
these countries do not differ much. The changes in the structure and concentration
of the banking markets as well as changes in the level of market power of the institu-
tions indicate the development of an oligopolistic system in these countries. This is
evidenced by the existence of a relatively small number of banks with relatively high
economic strength and a large market share that are able to limit the entrance of new
banks. Such changes are characteristic of the transitional period because of the
unfavourable financial and economic situation inherited from the previous system.
During the restructuring period, some banks had to be liquidated, and others were
purchased by foreign investors. Simultaneously, newly established private institutions,
characterised by insufficient capital and organisational power, could not threaten the
position of banks taken over by foreign investors. Therefore the lack of significant
impact of concentration and competition on stability in Macedonia could be related
to the market structures of these systems. A deeper analysis shows that the banking
system of Macedonia exhibits low H-statistic figures, which is characteristic of a mon-
opolistic market structure (Delis, 2009; Giustiniani & Ross, 2008; Yildirim &
Philippatos, 2007), but is dominated by three or five institutions, which suggests an
oligopolistic one (Davcev and Hourvouliades, 2013).
In the area of financial intermediation, both the share of deposits in the banking
sector relative to local GDP and credit to GDP had a positive effect in Croatia,
Macedonia and Serbia. Of these countries, Croatia is recognised as the most trans-
formed while reforms in Macedonia and Serbia are the most delayed not only in
comparison to Croatia but in relation to the whole region. These banking systems
had to deal with a number of problems, of which the need to restore clients’ confi-
dence and the low level of financial awareness were the most important.
The development of credit for the private sector (especially loans to households
compared to loans to enterprises) caused a strong increase in financial intermediation
rates (Backe et al., 2017). The general euroisation of loans and deposits remains one
of the greatest threats to financial stability in these countries, as it creates indirect
credit risk due to unsecured borrowers and it hinders the monetary policy transmis-
sion channel. Foreign currency loans represent a significant part of credit resources
in countries that do not use the euro as legal tender. At the aggregate level, these
loans were largely financed by foreign currency deposits, which alleviated the direct
currency risk for banks. At the same time, this deposit base also provided a stable
source of financing for foreign currency loans, potentially further promoting them.
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Increased non-performing loan ratios remain a challenge for financial stability in
most of the studied countries since they account for up to one-fifth of total loans,
and reducing them is a very difficult process despite the introduction of comprehen-
sive resolution strategies (Beckmann, 2017; Beckmann, Hildebrandt, & J€ager-Gyovai,
2015; Cuaresma, Fidrmuc, & Hake, 2014). In addition to limiting the development of
lending, the high level of non-performing loans also remains a burden on banks’
profitability, which remained heterogeneous in the period under consideration.
Because retained earnings are the main source of capital for banks, profitability ratios
are also helpful in assessing banks’ resilience to adverse shocks and therefore require
careful monitoring.
In terms of the business cycle, a negative impact of GDP per capita was significant
only in Montenegro. This remains consistent with the strand of literature explaining
that in the Western Balkan region there was a negative relationship between the
financial system and economic situation (Gillman and Harris, 2004; Mehl et al., 2005;
Abazi and Aliu, 2015). Secondly, Montenegro experienced the highest increase in
non-performing loans. This is due to the turbulence in the financial markets after
2008, as well as exceptionally high credit activity, liberal supervision regarding risk
taking, intensified market competition in the banking market and a high inflow of
international liquidity prior to 2008.
6. Conclusions
The countries analysed in this report share a common historical and economical
background, and may seem to be transforming their economies and economic sectors
(e.g., banking sector) in a similar way. This is partly right. The states created from
former SFR Yugoslavia have shared many common experiences related to statehood
and economic transformation which have created similar structures of banking sys-
tems with comparable changes in stability. Although two of the countries –
Montenegro and Serbia – were delayed with starting their transformation processes,
they have caught up very quickly and do not differ much from the average situation
in the region.
A stable banking system is one of the fundamental conditions for the proper func-
tioning of an economy and, at the same time, is a sine qua non condition for stable
long-term economic growth, making it very important. It is intriguing to note that
although all of the Western Balkan states developed a similar banking system struc-
ture, various factors influence banking stability. Two main conclusions may be drawn.
First, the most common factors affecting banking stability are market concentration
and market competition. In four out of five of the studied countries, these factors
played a significant role. Therefore aspects which may influence the number of banks,
e.g., barriers to entry for new institutions, or mergers and acquisitions of institutions,
should be considered with regard to their potential effects on banking stability.
Secondly, the study suggests that the stability of both the most transformed bank-
ing system in the region (Croatia) as well as the one which is considered the most
delayed (Serbia) are driven by similar factors, and market competition in the banking
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systems of these countries is being built in a similar way. Further analysis of these
two banking systems could confirm these assumptions.
The other banking systems in the region – despite the common roots and experi-
ences – vary in their determinants of banking stability. Most astonishingly, banking
stability in Bosnia is determined by only one factor – the low R2 coefficient. This
makes this banking system stand out from the others in the region because it suggests
that other aspects not researched in this paper play an important role in bank-
ing stability.
This study shows that similar experiences from the past do not constitute a suffi-
cient basis for the development of banking stability under the influence of the same
factors. Further analysis of non-economic factors could help in finding further deter-
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Appendix 1: Correlation matrix
Croatia
BSP HHI CR5 LI BON DEPOS CREDIT MSP GDP_c TRB
1.0000 0.0471 0.1753 0.0497 0.2373 0.4552 0.4973 0.0152 0.6893 0.4072 BSP
1.0000 0.7660 0.7050 0.7735 0.8335 0.7697 0.5295 0.5846 0.0740 HHI
1.0000 0.8075 0.4633 0.5232 0.5119 0.2893 0.4677 0.4605 CR5
1.0000 0.4663 0.6402 0.5776 0.3904 0.5148 0.3406 LI
1.0000 0.6435 0.6268 0.6841 0.3161 0.2980 BON
1.0000 0.9649 0.5394 0.8658 0.1700 DEPOS
1.0000 0.6180 0.9099 0.2732 CREDIT





BSP HHI CR5 LI BON DEPOS CREDIT MSP GDP_c TRB
1.0000 0.6449 0.8408 0.4958 0.1334 0.6675 0.6173 0.2725 0.5697 0.2349 BSP
1.0000 0.6615 0.6637 0.3575 0.9316 0.9583 0.4083 0.9240 0.6840 HHI
1.0000 0.6333 0.2443 0.7831 0.6530 0.4733 0.5589 0.2319 CR5
1.0000 0.0199 0.7640 0.5846 0.4807 0.4322 0.2866 LI
1.0000 0.3992 0.5046 0.0611 0.5836 0.4908 BON
1.0000 0.9450 0.5012 0.8604 0.6709 DEPOS
1.0000 0.3712 0.9620 0.7957 CREDIT





BSP HHI CR5 LI BON DEPOS CREDIT MSP GDP_c TRB
1.0000 0.4925 0.3864 0.2714 0.7907 0.9140 0.8627 0.3500 0.9375 0.7939 BSP
1.0000 0.2105 0.1975 0.5275 0.2969 0.1580 0.2742 0.3902 0.1717 HHI
1.0000 0.4850 0.4381 0.4923 0.2402 0.0005 0.5921 0.7021 CR5
1.0000 0.3490 0.2363 0.2302 0.2370 0.3316 0.1897 LI
1.0000 0.8343 0.7394 0.1160 0.8364 0.6817 BON
1.0000 0.9347 0.4211 0.9808 0.9164 DEPOS
1.0000 0.5970 0.8894 0.7836 CREDIT





BSP HHI CR5 LI BON DEPOS CREDIT MSP GDP_c TRB
1.0000 0.8049 0.6453 0.0256 0.4500 0.9252 0.9373 0.2746 0.9424 0.4989 BSP
1.0000 0.7944 0.1889 0.6324 0.9555 0.9097 0.3859 0.8969 0.2688 HHI
1.0000 0.6571 0.4174 0.7686 0.7561 0.2409 0.7398 0.2393 CR5
1.0000 0.0958 0.1009 0.0870 0.3166 0.1092 0.1803 LI
1.0000 0.6348 0.5793 0.0019 0.5347 0.0843 BON
1.0000 0.9849 0.2691 0.9733 0.4168 DEPOS
1.0000 0.1688 0.9894 0.5304 CREDIT





Appendix 2: Variance inflation factor results
Serbia Croatia Montenegro Macedonia BH
R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF
BSP – – – – – – – – – –
HHI 0,606975 2,5 0,891465 9,2 0,492988 2 0,899247 9,9 0,947738 19,1
CR5 0,898353 9,8 0,865198 7,4 0,879715 8,3 0,923746 13,1 0,598597 2,5
LI 0,435853 1,8 0,6478 2,8 0,437569 1,8 0,826226 5,8 0,67883 3,1
BON 0,059119 1,1 0,734479 3,8 0,735048 3,8 0,202202 1,3 0,147993 1,2
DEPOS 0,950653 20,3 0,965268 28,8 0,981371 53,7 0,990919 110,1 0,952547 21,1
CREDIT 0,907193 10,8 0,965371 28,9 0,957752 23,7 0,992534 133,9 0,969935 33,3
MSP 0,099367 1,1 0,580626 2,4 0,31184 1,5 0,444558 1,8 0,061346 1,1
GDP_c 0,957807 23,7 0,916683 12 0,982431 56,9 0,972181 35,9 0,944015 17,9
TBR 0,960262 25,2 0,700579 3,3 0,934497 15,3 0,337458 1,5 0,750658 4
Reference: own preparation.
Serbia
BSP HHI CR5 LI BON DEPOS CREDIT MSP GDP_c TRB
1.0000 0.5009 0.8443 0.0191 0.6337 0.7896 0.6903 0.1582 0.9186 0.8626 BSP
1.0000 0.3521 0.0604 0.1100 0.8078 0.7176 0.3506 0.7048 0.6057 HHI
1.0000 0.0926 0.3945 0.6134 0.4826 0.2066 0.7490 0.9003 CR5
1.0000 0.1866 0.1542 0.2798 0.0791 0.0822 0.0998 LI
1.0000 0.2920 0.3508 0.1161 0.4388 0.3339 BON
1.0000 0.9070 0.3698 0.9545 0.7910 DEPOS
1.0000 0.3456 0.8484 0.5661 CREDIT
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